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Residents of Joe Slovo
Community v Thubelisha Homes
and Others: The Two Faces of
Engagement
Brian Ray *
1. Introduction
In its most recent housing-rights decision, Residents of Joe Slovo Community
v Thubelisha Homes and Others Uce Slovo),1 the South African Constitutional
Court ('the Constitutional Court') approved the eviction of nearly 20,000 resi-
dents of an informal settlement north of Cape Town as part of a major redevel-
opment of the N2 Highway known as the 'N2 Gateway Project'. The
decision-with its echoes of the mass displacements of the apartheid era-
disappointed housing-rights advocates who had hoped the Constitutional
Court would extend its landmark decision in Government of the Republic of
South Africa v Grootboom, 2 where it held that the City of Cape Town and other
government entities failed to meet their obligations to ensure adequate access
to housing as required by section 26 of the South African Constitution. 3
By most accounts, the N2 Gateway Project was plagued from the start by
bureaucratic mismanagement and an almost complete failure to meaningfully
consult residents on the relocation process and their prospects for obtaining
*Assistant Professor of Law Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, OH 44115, USA
(brian.ray @law. csuohio. edu).
1 Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Joe Slovo) [2009] ZACC 16.
2 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); [2000] ZACC 19.
3 Section 26 states: '(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. (2) The state
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realisation of this right. (3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have
their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant cir-
cumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions:'
Human Rights Law Review 10:2 (2010). 360-371
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housing in the planned development. The Constitutional Court highlighted
these failures throughout the judgment but nonetheless approved the
Government's plans to move forward with the project. In a partial victory for
the residents, however, the Constitutional Court imposed stringent conditions
on the relocation process and deployed a substantially strengthened version of
the 'engagement' requirement it had first developed in an earlier eviction case,
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and Others v City of Johannesburg
and Others (Olivia Road).4
At its core is a simple requirement that government consult with residents
before evicting them, as engagement offers a creative and flexible tool for advo-
cates of socio-economic rights to enforce these provisions through both polit-
ical and legal channels. But the government's failure to engage meaningfully
earlier in the planning process for the N2 Gateway Project illustrates the risks
inherent in the flexibility of engagement. Absent adequate court oversight, en-
gagement can easily turn into nothing more than a requirement that govern-
ment inform residents of its redevelopment plans. The Constitutional Court in
Joe Slovo, recognised these two 'faces' of engagement and strengthened the
remedy by adding components that increase the transparency of the process
and enhance court control. This note first describes the engagement remedy,
briefly summarises the key features of the Joe Slovo litigation and then analyses
the innovations that the Constitutional Court introduced in its decision.
2. Olivia Road and the Engagement Requirement
The Constitutional Court first developed the engagement remedy in its judg-
ment in Olivia Road delivered in February 2008. Like Joe Slovo, the Olivia Road
case involved a challenge by residents of an informal community to the evic-
tion programme of a major municipality that was part of a broader redevelop-
ment programme. The City of Johannesburg planned to clear so-called 'bad'
buildings in an effort to revitalise and redevelop the city centre. 5 The High
Court issued an injunction stopping the programme comnpletely, but the
Supreme Court of Appeal reversed that order and permitted the evictions to
proceed provided the government offered temporary accommodation to the
displaced residents. When the case reached the Constitutional Court, it issued
a surprising interim order following oral argument requiring the parties to
'engage' with each other to try and resolve the dispute. That process was re-
markably successful and resulted in a settlement that provided the residents
with most of the relief they had sought and laid the groundwork for continued
4 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC); [2008] ZAcc 1.
5 For a more detailed summary and analysis of Olivia Road, see Ray'Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road:
Enforcing the Right to Adequate Housing through "Engagement", (2008) 8 Human Rights
Law Review 703.
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engagement over the larger issues of inner-city housing among the City, the
residents and the civil society organisations involved in the litigation.
In its final order approving the settlement, the Constitutional Court, to the
parties' surprise, refused to address arguments regarding the City's broader
obligations under section 26 left open by the settlement and instead held
that 'engagement' is a constitutional requirement in all eviction cases. The
Constitutional Court went on to identify several key characteristics of engage-
ment. First, engagement is a flexible remedy, and courts should craft each en-
gagement order to meet the specific needs of each case. Second, engagement
must be systematic and not ad hoc. Here, the Constitutional Court specifically
emphasised that any redevelopment plan like that of the City of Johannesburg
must incorporate engagement into the planning process from the start. Third,
civil society organisations must be included in the process as facilitators and
representatives of vulnerable citizens. Finally, the State must keep a detailed
public record of each engagement effort so that a court can review those efforts
if the process breaks down.
3. The Joe Slowo Decision
The Joe Slovo case demonstrates the Constitutional Court's most recent use of
engagement, and is one of only three cases in which it has employed the
remedy 6 The case involved the City of Cape Town's major redevelopment project
along the N2 Highway the principal North-South corridor leading into Cape
Town. 7 The project required the eviction and relocation of over 4,000 families,
living in an informal community known as the Joe Slovo settlement, to a
hastily developed Temporary Relocation Area in Delft, an area much further
from the city where many of the residents worked.8 This project was part of
the Breaking New Ground policy-a broader national policy developed following
Grootboomn to redevelop informal settlements throughout the country and was
intended to serve as a model for other similar projects. 9
.Many of the residents originally embraced the plan, in part because the City
and the developer promised that most of them would be entitled to return to
the new development and rent at low-cost the new housing.10 But when the
first of the three phases of the project was complete, none of the houses were
allocated to the low rental bracket the residents claim they were promised.
6 The third case. Mamba v Minister of Social Development CCT 65/08, involved a challenge to
the Gauteng Government's closure of temporary refugee camps for victims of the xenophobic
violence that South Africa experienced in the spring of 2008.
7 Joe Slovo, supra n. 1. See also. Thubelisha Homes and Others v Various Occupants and Others
(13189/07) [2008] ZAWCHC at para. 7 (Joe Slovo High Court).
8 Joe Slovo, supra n. 1 at para. 1 25 (Moseneke DCJ).
9 tbid. at para. 25 (Yacoob J) and para. 327 (Sachs J).
10 Ibid. at para 327 (Sachs J) and paras 31-33 (Yacoob J).
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In addition, Phase 2 included no housing for low-income residents, only
'bonded housing, that is, market-rate housing for purchase through a
mortgage.11
In response to these 'broken promises,'the residents began to organise both
formal and informal protests against the development, culminating in a major
protest in September 2007 in which residents blocked access to the N2
Highway 12 The State and the developer, Thubelisha Homes, brought an emer-
gency application in the Cape High Court seeking an injunction ordering the
eviction of the residents under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 1998, known as 'PIE'*13
The High Court issued a decision permitting the relocations to proceed and
denying the residents relief shortly after the Constitutional Court issued its
opinion in Olivia Road. The High Court opened with praise for the State's
increased sensitivity 'to the constitutional values underpinning any develop-
ment project' and criticism of the residents' resort to self-help in protesting the
relocation.14 A central issue in the case was the State's failure to fulfil its prom-
ise to provide 70% of the housing developed on the Joe Slovo site to the dis-
placed residents.1 5 Phase 1 failed to meet this goal, and the developer refused
to commit to fulfilling it in Phase 2 of the project.16 This promise was just one
of several unfulfilled commitments that the residents argued demonstrated at
best insufficient consultation and at worst bad faith by the State and the devel-
oper. The High Court gave short shrift to these arguments concluding, in a
highly technical discussion, that the residents had no 'legitimate expectation'
to the promised housing because they were unlawful occupants of the
territory.17
The High Court made only passing reference to the newly established en-
gagement requirement. After noting that Olivia Road requires courts to exam-
ine whether a redevelopment process included engagement with residents
subject to eviction, the High Court found that the residents' own claims that
the State in a series of meetings promised to allocate 70% of the houses in
Phase 1 to them was itself evidence of sufficient engagement with the
residents.'18
The residents appealed directly to the Constitutional Court. Several of the
same groups that were active in organising the residents in Olivia Road sub-
mitted amicus curiae briefs to the Constitutional Court in which they argued
11 Ibid. at para. 32 (Yacoob J) and paras 371 and 373-4 (Sachs J).
12 Joe Slov'o High Court, supra n. 7 at para. 16. See also. Joe Slovo, supra. n. 1 at para. 34 (Yacoob J)
and paras 327 and 376-8 (Sachs J).
13 Joe Slovo. supra n. 1 at para. 15 (Yacoob J).
14 See Joe Slovo High Court, supra n. 7 at para. 16.
15 Ibid. at paras 69-76.
16 Ibid. at para. 72.
17 Ibid. at paras 75-6.
18 Ibid. at para. 24.
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specifically that the City of Cape Town had failed to adequately engage with the
residents.19 The Court granted those groups permission to present this issue
at oral argument .2 0 During the hearing, Deputy Chief justice Dikgang
Moseneke suggested that further engagement might resolve the case.'
No further negotiations occurred, however, and the Constitutional Court
delivered its judgment in June 2009. The decision consists of five different
opinions spanning 221 pages. All five opinions concur in the final order that
prescribes a structured eviction process requiring engagement with the resi-
dents to determine most of the significant details for eviction and relocation. 2 2
In addition to the unanimous order, all of the justices rejected-but for sub-
stantially different reasons-the residents' core contention that the length of
their occupation combined with the City of Cape Town's periodic provision of
services and efforts to improve the living conditions in the settlement consti-
tuted uninterrupted consent for their occupation of the land. justice Yacoob,
joined by justices Langa and Van der Westhuizen, agreed with the city that it
had never consented to the occupation. But justices Ncbobo, Moseneke,
O'Regan and Sachs each wrote separately to emphasise that, as justice Sachs
describes it, 'the community lawfully occupied the land with the knowledge,
acquiescence and support of the [City] Council, but on the understanding
that their occupation would be of a temporary nature pending the provision
by the state of adequate housing. 2 3
Despite their differences over the issue of consent, all of the opinions agreed
on two key points. First, each emphasised the failure of State authorities to ad-
equately communicate with the residents as the project moved forward.
justice Sachs was the most forceful on this point:
There can be no doubt that there were major failures of communication
on the part of the authorities. The evidence suggests the frequent employ-
ment of a top-down approach where the purpose of reporting back to
the community was seen as being to pass on information about decisions
already taken rather than to involve the residents as partners in the
process of decision-making itself.24
19 See Joe Slovo, supra n. 1, noting that '[t]he community law centre of the University of the
Western Cape and the Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions were admitted as friends of
the court, in support of the residents right to be properly consulted before being evicted:
20 See Mamba, Further Directions by the Chief justice, 15 August 2008, available at: http://
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/Cgisirsi/8dgHpyueX6/MAIN//57/518/0/
D2-ccT22-08 [last accessed 14 January 2010].
21 Joubert. It's our duty not to be silent, Mail & Guardian, 24 August 2008, available at: http:/I
www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-24-its-our-duty-not-to-be-silent [last accessed 13 January
2010].
22 Joe Slovo. supra n. 1 at paras 4-5 (Vacnnh 1).
23 Ibid. at para. 329 (Sachs J).
24 Ibid. at para. 378 (Sachs J).
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justice Ncgobo found that the State attempted to engage at various points
with the residents but the lack of coordination by the entities involved con-
fused the residents causing 'mistrust [that] has prevented any meaningful en-
gagement on relocation from taking place without the intervention of this
Court' 2 5 And justice O'Regan observed that 'much of the heat that has been
generated in this case has been generated because the respondents did not
engage fully and meaningfully with the applicants and the other communities
who have an interest in the housing project. '26
Second, all of the opinions found that the High Court's order completely
failed to address this communication breakdown, and that the Constitution
required a much more structured order that included consultation with the
residents on the details of the relocation process. On this point each of the
judgments-and the unanimous order-highlighted the engagement process
the Constitutional Court had established in Olivia Road as a critical require-
ment. justice Moseneke concluded his concurrence finding that the eviction
order was just and equitable only because it was paired 'with a further order
guaranteeing that the applicants shall be allocated the specified proportion of
the new houses ... within a process of meaningful engagement with the
people who are the subject of the eviction and relocation order. 27 justice
Ncgobo similarly identified engagement as 'crucial' to a relocation process
'that is fair to the residents and that has regard to the Constitution.?8
The unanimous order reflected this consensus that the evictions would only
be constitutional if the process included meaningful engagement with the resi-
dents. The Constitutional Court specifically noted that its decision that eviction
was just and equitable in this case was predicated on the key differences be-
tween its order and the largely unqualified eviction order issued by the High
Court. It highlighted three principal differences between the two orders. First,
the Constitutional Court's order required the City to allocate at least 70% of
the new homes to the displaced residents. Second, it specified the quality of
the temporary housing in Delft. Finally the Constitutional Court required 'an
ongoing process of engagement between the residents and the respondents
concerning the relocation process. 29
In contrast to its earlier engagement orders, which did not include detailed
instructions for the engagement process itself, here the Constitutional Court
imposed a relatively specific structure. First, it ordered engagement on three
broad issues: the date the relocation would begin, the timetable for the process
and 'any other relevant matter. '30 The Court then established an even more
25 Ibid. at para. 247 (Ncgobo 1).
26 Ibid. at para. 301 (O'Regan J).
27 Ibid. at para. 175 (Moseneke 1).
28 Ibid. at para. 261 (Ncobo J).
29 Ibid. at para. 5.
30 Ibid. at para. 7.5.
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specific agenda of seven issues for the engagement. These include details
such as '[t]he exact time, manner and conditions' of each relocation and
'[tlhe precise temporary residential accommodation units' allocated to each
resident. 31 Finally, the Constitutional Court retained jurisdiction over the case
requiring the parties to report the results of these engagements and also grant-
ing explicit permission for any party to seek relief directly from it '[s]hould
this order not be complied with by any party or should the order give rise to
unforeseen difficulties'.3 2
4. Engagement After Joe Slowo
Early reaction to the decision has been generally critical of the Constitutional
Court's refusal to find in favour of the residents. Kate Tissington, a researcher
at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies who was active in the litigation, wrote
a scathing critique of the judgment describing the Constitutional Court as
'completely naive and out of touch with reality, failing at its duty to adjudicate
on socio-economic rights compromised by bad implementation of wrongly in-
terpreted government policy. 33 The Legal Resources Centre issued a press re-
lease describing the result as mixed, but highlighting the fact that it 'is the
largest judicially sanctioned eviction of a community in post-apartheid South
Africa.' 34 Pierre De Vs, while acknowledging that 'the judgment shows a genu-
ine concern for the plight of the Joe Slovo residents,' criticised the substantive
holdings as failing to expect 'the state to act in an honest manner and to
cater also for the most vulnerable and poor members of a well-established com-
munity whose area is to be upgraded' 35 Sandra Liebenberg, in an opinion edi-
torial published by Business Day expressed similar concerns. After noting
that the detailed requirements of the Constitutional Court's order were a
marked improvement over the High Court's order, Liebenberg said that 'the
willingness to effectively condone the inadequate consultation processes
raises serious concerns.' 36
31 Ibid. at paras 11.2-11.3.
32 Ibid. at para. 21.
33 Tissington, 'South Africa: Joe Slovo Residents Let Down by Court, all Africacom, 26 June
2009, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/Printable/200906260735.html [last accessed 13
January 2010].
34 Legal Resources Centre, 'Residents of Joe Slovo Lose and Win in the Constitutional Court', 16
June 2009, available at: http://www.lrc.org.za/press-releases/1008-2009-06-16-residents-of-
joe-slovo-lose-and-win-in-the-constitutional-court-rc [last accessed 13 January 2010].
35 De vos, Joe Slovo Case: The Good, the Bad and the (mostly) Unstated, Constitutionally Speaking,
14 June 2009. available at: http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/joe-slovo-case-the-good-
the-bad-and-the-mostly-unstated/ [last accessed 13 January 2010].
36 Liebenberg, 'toe Slovo Eviction: Vulnerable Community Feels the Law from the Top Down,
Business Day. 22 June 2009 available at: http://www.businessdayco.za/articles/
Content. aspx?id= 73812 [last accessed 14 January 2010].
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The ambivalence these reactions express over the judgment reflect to a large
degree the Constitutional Court's own emerging recognition that, while en-
gagement can be a powerful mechanism for protecting human dignity and
enforcing socio-economic rights, the flexibility and indeterminacy that give it
that potential also pose the risk that it can, as Liebenberg describes it,
'become a meaningless platitude in realising socioeconomic rights. '37 The
deeply flawed 'consultation that led to the Joe Slovo litigation illustrates that
over-reliance on procedural mechanisms like engagement for enforcement of
these rights without sufficient court control, and periodic substantive inter-
ventions can permit the government to ignore the obligations the
Constitution imposes. At the same time, the tightly controlled and structured
engagement process the Constitutional Court established to minimise the
harsh effects of the eviction also demonstrate the continued potential that the
remedy has for enforcing socio-economic rights.
The Constitutional Court's evident enthusiasm for the remedy is under-
standable. While it expressed support for using this kind of negotiation or
mediation in earlier cases, the Constitutional Court always stopped short of
actually ordering it in a particular case. Its first experiment with the process
in Olivia Road was incredibly successful, resulting in a settlement that both
sides were committed to and that clearly protected the rights of the evictees
and offered the prospect for broader policy changes. 38
Engagement also fits well within the Constitutional Court's clear reluctance
to dictate specific policy changes when faced with a challenge based princi-
pally on one of the socio-economic rights provisions of the Constitution. Like
the declaratory judgment in Grootboomn and the constitutional-damages
remedy in another eviction case, President of the Republic of South Africa v
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,'39 engagement by itself has only an indirect
effect on specific policies, leaving the details up to the political branches.
Indeed, engagement as used in Olivia Road, where the Court itself had not yet
decided any of the substantive issues in the case, offers an even less directive
mechanism than either constitutional damages or a declaration because it
does not require a ruling on the merits.
Joe Slovo is consistent with this pattern. As Tissington points out, the
Constitutional Court appears to have largely accepted the Government's deci-
sion to go forward with the N2 Gateway Project, and its determination that re-
location of the residents rather than in situ upgrade was the only feasible way
37 ibid.
38 See Ray, supra n. 4. See also Tissington, 'Challenging Inner City Evictions Before the
Constitutional Court of South Africa: The Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road case, (2008) 5
Housing and ESC Rights Law Quarterly 1.
39 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC); [2005] ZACC 5. Although the Constitutional Court held that it need
not address whether Section 26 was implicated in Modderklip, it cited Section 26 throughout
the decision.
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to accomplish the project's goals. The Constitutional Court was also unwill-
ing-despite clear recognition of the Government's failure to negotiate mean-
ingfully with the residents-to halt a government project of this magnitude
in order to rectify the serious procedural defects in the planning process.4 0
Both aspects of the decision highlight the Constitutional Court's reluctance to
use these rights-either the substantive or procedural dimensions-to alter
in any significant manner a policy or programme that is well underway.
But the Constitutional Court's engagement order suggests an increased
understanding that more muscular oversight by the judiciary is critical to de-
veloping the engagement process into an effective enforcement mechanism.
The principal advantage to a more robust engagement process that incorpor-
ates judicial control is that it creates a procedure for placing direct pressure
on the political branches to develop policies sensitive to constitutional obliga-
tions and thus preserves litigation as a tool for citizens and civil society
to press for increased attention to socio-economic rights. At the same time,
by focusing on the procedural rather than substantive dimensions of
socio-economic rights, engagement permits courts to refrain from dictating
policy specifics.
In Olivia Road, the Constitutional Court ordered engagement over the evic-
tion order at a point where the Government was already considering adopting
a revised plan for inner-city development and had stopped pursuing the
challenged eviction policy This set the stage for the successful negotiation
that ultimately resulted. In that context, the very general engagement order
combined with an obligation to report back to the Constitutional Court was
sufficient by itself to trigger reconsideration of the challenged policy and
good-faith negotiation over how to develop a revised policy consistent with
the obligations section 26 imposes. But, following a disastrously ineffective en-
gagement order in another case, 41 the Constitutional Court in Joe Slovo recog-
nised the need to structure the engagement order in ways that enhanced the
accountability of the parties to the negotiation.
The Constitutional Court's order adopts several innovations that can be
adapted in future socio-economic rights cases to improve the effectiveness of
this novel remedy including a detailed agenda for the engagement, a baseline
40 See Liebenberg, supra n. 36, stating that [a] few of the judges held that the laudable objectives
and greater good of the N2 Gateway project outweighed the defects in the consultation pro-
cess. It would be too burdensome to expect higher standards from the state in these
circumstances.'
41 Mamba v Minister of Social Development, supra n. 6. In Mamba, the Constitutional Court
ordered the Gauteng Government to engage with a group of foreign national refugees dis-
placed by the xenophobic violence that swept through parts of South Africa in the spring of
2007 over closure of the camps where they were housed. The Government effectively ignored
the order and treated it as requiring it to merely report to the residents and others the pro-
gress of its closure plans.
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substantive interpretation and more direct court oversight of the process.
Increasing control over the details of the negotiation agenda accomplishes
two things: first, it establishes a substantive framework for the negotiation
that forces the parties to bargain over key aspects of the challenged policy
Rather than leaving it to the parties to develop their own agenda, the Court de-
cides which issues are most important and subject to potential concessions.
Most critically, in the Joe Slovo case, the Government is required to negotiate
the overall timetable for the relocation and the precise terms of the relocation
for each individual and family This creates considerable leverage for the resi-
dents to negotiate a process that is attentive to their constitutional rights on
both a group and an individual level.
Greater transparency is also possible with a more detailed agenda. This is
particularly important if the negotiations break down and the parties return
to the Constitutional Court for resolution. The public-record requirement the
Constitutional Court established in Olivia Road already requires the State to
keep detailed records of the process. An order that includes a detailed list of ne-
gotiation items will require a detailed account of precise negotiations over
each individual item. This will create an even more robust record on which a
court faced with a negotiation impasse can determine whether to order fur-
ther engagement-possibly with a revised agenda-or to order substantive
relief on the basis of the information disclosed during the structured
negotiation.
The Constitutional Court's substantive decision that the project must reserve
at least 70% of the new housing stock for the displaced residents is also a
significant innovation. In its earlier uses of the remedy the Constitutional
Court ordered engagement before addressing any issue on the merits. Here,
the Court effectively determined that the parties' own negotiations resulted in
a commitment to reserve 70% of the housing stock for the displaced residents,
and that the Government failed to fulfil it in the first two phases of the project.
By taking this aspect of the policy off the table in the engagement, the Court
both resolved a key issue in the case and also enhanced the bargaining pos-
ition of the residents by requiring the Government to take seriously their de-
mands over the relocation process.
This aspect of the decision also highlights the flexibility of engage-
ment. Courts can deploy it alone, as happened in Olivia Road, or in combina-
tion with a range of substantive remedies on select issues in the case.
This flexibility to decide which issues are appropriate for resolution by engage-
ment and which require immediate court resolution gives courts further
power to structure the remedy in a way that is most likely to be effective in
each case.
Finally the Constitutional Court's decision to retain jurisdiction increases
the likelihood that the parties will engage meaningfully because failure to do
so runs the direct risk of court sanction. By controlling the process and
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permitting the parties to seek its intervention during the engagement process
over relocation, the Constitutional Court has provided the residents with an
important lever to force the State to do more than merely report on the pro-
gress of implementation.
5. Conclusion and Post-script
Several weeks after issuing its decision in Joe Slovo, the Constitutional Court
quietly suspended its order 'until further notice' in response to a report sub-
mitted by the Western Cape Minister for Housing that stated he had 'grave con-
cerns' that the relocation plan might be more expensive than an onsite
upgrade of the Joe Slovo settlement. 4 2 In a news report on the suspension
order, a special adviser to the National Human Settlements Minister said that
he 'thought it best that the evictions be postponed to allow the government
time to consult with residents. '4 3
In the end, then, it appears that De Vos' assessment was correct: the
Constitutional Court's engagement order-while on its face an approval of the
Government's decision to relocate the residents-in fact opened the door to
renegotiating the decision itself. The above quotations acknowledge that the
engagement order forced the State to reconsider its approach to housing in
the Joe Slovo case and that it is now seriously considering adopting the resi-
dents' proposal and plans to continue to consult them on possible revisions to
the plan. This result illustrates the power of a well-structured engagement
order to change social and economic policy Although the Court ultimately
gave the State permission to proceed with relocation, by conditioning it on en-
gagement with the residents over the details, the State was forced to carefully
consider the relative costs and benefits of the plan, and it now appears likely
the State will change course. Courts considering engagement in future cases
should draw lessons from the specific characteristics of the Joe Slovo order
that arguably contributed to this success, in particular the enhanced court
oversight and more specific agenda, as well as the Court's substantive reso-
lution of specific issues.
Further refinement of the Joe Slovo engagement model holds promise for the
remedy to develop into an effective enforcement mechanism in socio-economic
rights litigation, but the real potential for engagement lies elsewhere. The
Constitutional Court described engagement in Olivia Road as a mechanism
to make social and economic rights a salient part of the policy development
42 Majavu, 'Evictions Suspended - Shack Dwellers Reprieved, Sowetan, 4 September 2009, avail-
able at: http://www.sowetan.co.za/News/Article.aspx?id=1060093 [last accessed 14 January
2010].
43 [bid.
Residents of Joe Slovo Community v Thubelisha Homes and Others 371
process.4 4 Although it did not employ engagement in its most recent
socio-economic rights decision, the Constitutional Court re-emphasised that
these rights play a primarily political role:
[L~itigation of [the positive obligations imposed by social and economic
rights] fosters a form of participative democracy that holds government
accountable and requires it to account between elections over specific as-
pects of government PoliCy,45
Engagement has the potential to radicalise that political role even further by
giving citizens and civil society groups the right to demand consultation from
the outset of any policy development process. The right to consultation at the
very beginning of the process offers much greater opportunity to meaningfully
affect policy and to ensure appropriate attention to the obligations these
rights impose than litigation challenging the implementation of an existing
policy
44 For a preliminary account of how engagement could be developed as a tool for political advo-
cacy, see Ray, 'Engagement's Possibilities and Limits as a Socioeconomic Rights Remedy,
(2010) 9 Washington University Global Studies Law Review (forthcoming).
45 Mazibuko and Others v City ofjohannesburg and Others CCT 39/09 [2009] ZACC 28, at para. 160.
